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A Deterrence Model to Curbing Human Trafficking in the United States  
Michelle Crawford Rickert 
Human trafficking is squarely a criminal justice problem.  In order to eradicate human trafficking 
the traffickers need to be deterred from engaging in the business of trafficking in people.  From a 
law and economics perspective, optimal deterrence is reached when a sentence or fine is just 
greater than the probability of getting caught multiplied by the benefit to the criminal.   Utilizing 
this model, the proposed presentation will attempt to demonstrate how to sufficiently deter the 
trafficker by increasing probability of prosecutions through local laws, increasing the fines and 
sentences of traffickers once convicted, and increasing the certainty of detection through 
increased law enforcement training and public awareness campaigns.  Additionally, this 
presentation will address the issues that the deterrence model does not deal with as readily 
including organized criminal units which are vertically integrated, and cultural trafficking of 
domestic servants, both of which likely deserve departure from this model to account for 
motivational factors.  
Human Trafficking 
in the United States 
 
by:   
Prof. Michelle Crawford Rickert 
Liberty University  
Helms School of Government  
Photographs Tyler  Nicole Crawford 
Human 
Trafficking is 
an International  
Business 
Criminal Justice Problem  
o As Kathleen Davis of Polaris 
Project explains human 
trafficking is a criminal justice 
problem 
o The TVPA takes a proper 
victim-centered approach:  
Prosecution, Prevention, 
Protection  
Economics of Optimal 
Deterrence of Crime  
  
 
“ Individuals rationally decide whether 
to engage in criminal activities by 
comparing the expected returns of  




Nuno Garoupa, “The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement” (citing 
Becker, 1968) 
 
        
Optimal Criminal Deterrence  
o Lord Shawness (and Beccaria) “Some Judges 
preoccupy themselves with methods of 
punishment.  This is their job.  But in 
preventing crime it is of less significance 
then they like to think. Certainty of 
detection is far more important than 
severity of punishment.” 
 
o Bentham: “the more deficient in certainty 
of punishment the severer it should be”   
 
Gary Becker, Crime Punishment:  An Economic Approach. 
Optimal Deterrence Theory 
o Decrease Crime:  probability of detection 
and/or  severity of punishment =  a 
particular criminal activity 
o Allows for non-detection:  If the risk for 
non-detection is great then the sentence 
should be harsher to sufficiently deter 
Optimal Punishment 
o Price Discrimination and Uncertainty:   
Criminal only “pays”  if they are caught 
and convicted otherwise it is free.  He/She 
does have to factor in “nuisance arrests.”  
   
o Rational Actor:  will weigh these factors 
and determine the risks   
 
o Risk Aversion:  Some criminals are more 
risk adverse  than others 
Sentencing at times needs 
to be Tempered 
 Efficiently proportioned legal rule:  precise 
enough to make the crime unprofitable, allowing 
for the risk of non-detection. For example, if the 
value of the theft is $100 and the probability of 
detection is 1/3, then the optimal penalty would be 
a fine of approximately $301, or just enough to 
make the theft unprofitable. 
 
White Collar Phenomena  
o Downward Departure for White 
Collar Criminals:  the theory is 
that juries are less likely to 
convict if the penalties are too 
high  
o But:  Juries do convict and give 
high awards if there is a moral 
component (see the Tobacco 
Settlements; Martha Stewart)  
Go Through the Looking Glass 
• To uncover the victims of human 
trafficking and modern day slavery 
and to deter their captors  
 
• Thousands of victims in the U.S. yet 
they are hidden from view which 
creates a challenge for investigators 
and prosecutors 
 
Increasing Probability of Getting Caught/ 
Certainty of Detection  
• Victims are not standard 
• Psychological trauma from 
daily mental abuse & torture, 
depression, stress-related 
disorders, disorientation, 
phobias and panic attacks 
• Feelings of helplessness, 
shame, humiliation, shock, 
denial or disbelief 
• Cultural shock from finding 
themselves in strange country 
 
 
Increase the Certainty of 
Detection 
 • Train Local Law Enforcement:  The more time 
and money  that is spent on police and court 
personnel the easier it is to discover offenses and 
convict the offenders.” 
  
• Public Awareness: first                                                
contact with the victims 
 
• Civil Society:  cannot rely on government alone 
NGO’s play an important role 
Increase the Penalties  
• Higher (within reason):  Sentences and Fines 
need to be higher if the cases are difficult to 
prosecute or detect 
 
• Fines: Human Trafficking is a business  and 
through the use of fines one can make the 
business too expensive to run efficiently 
Need State Laws and Federal Laws 
• Increase prosecutions (more manpower 
and more training)  
• Can stack human trafficking charges with 
other crimes to get proper deterrence 
effect 
• Fill gaps in the federal law  
• Decreases profit margin of the offenders 
Education of the Public is Key  
• Increase probability of detection: with public 
awareness, victims are more likely to be detected by 
neighbors, etc.  
• Incentivize corporations to self police (chocolate) 
• Understand the issues:  To make sure all public 
outcry is for the victims (some in the public in 
Hawaii actually sided with labor traffickers who grew 
particularly good crops 
• Help get legislative support 
 
• Organized Crime  
• Cultural Trafficking  
• Diplomatic Immunity 
Organized Crime  in the    
Business of Human Trafficking   
• International in Nature: Crimes 
committed in different countries 
• Profitability:  Human trafficking 
just as profitable as drugs but the 
penalty is not as great 
• Diversification:  Nigerian, 
Albanian, Turkish, Japanese, etc. 
work in multiple venues 
Organized Crime in the 
Business of Human Trafficking   
• Mafia Wars on Facebook: On of 
the highest levels in the game is 
participating in human trafficking 
• Gambino Family– due to the 
money making potential even the 
Gambino family is getting 
involved in the sex trafficking of 
minors  
 
Organized Crime:  Does not 
respond to traditional deterrence 
models   
• Vertical integration and divisions 
of labor changes risk adverseness 
of players.   
• Couple this with the internal 
organizational sanctions for 
disobedience  for “ratting” 
Organized Crime  
o Increase Fines:  Problem after a certain 
amount it doesn’t increase deterrence  
o Risk Neutrality:  organized individual 
act as risk neutral even if alone they 
would be risk adverse 
o Avoiding Detection:  organized 
criminals are ahead of the game 
o Corruption:  Economies of Scale and 
Access to Information allows  
corruption  
Cultural Trafficking 
• Some cultures still see the servant/master as a cultural 
right 
• Traffickers need to understand criminal nature of the act 
for deterrence theory to work 
• In this circumstance education on the criminality needs to 
be the focus, and there should be publicity as to the 
sentences people are receiving for the crime 
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SALLY STOECKER AND LOUISE SHELLEY, HUMAN TRAFFIC AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: EURASIAN AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE (2005). 
As the United Nation’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute Training Guide 
explained when human trafficking is part of organized crime it is typically transnational and 
concerns many crimes in different jurisdictions.
The organized crime might start in Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and spread all over Europe or 
to the U.S and Canada (esp massage parlors and escort services in the Montreal area).  
Human Trafficking in Canada:  A Threat Assessment.
17
Kathleen Davis, Organized Crime and Human Trafficking, The North Star Blog.  When 
discussing an interview with an FBI agent who was formally undercover with the Gambino
family it was noted that, “While undercover, Garcia had noted the mafia in strip clubs and 
some involvement in prostitution, but he had never come across sex trafficking of children. 
He noted that the Italian mafia had a certain “ethics”—if there is such a thing among 
criminals—that prohibited any involvement or harm of women and children. For him and 
others, sex trafficking was a new low for the mafia, and it was clearly about finding new 
avenues for profit.”
18
Think of this like the prisoners dilemma, but the players do have some information as to 
what will happen to them if they “rat.” 
19
Nuno Garoupa,  The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement (1997).  
Garoupa’s conclusion is to not necessarily increase law enforcement policy when it comes 
to organized crime because what really fixes the problem is destroying the business.  If you 
merely increase enforcement if becomes “a competition of who is tougher, who is more 
frightful.  As a consequence , the loss of welfare can be too great.”  
20
Example is bringing in a Haitian Restavek.  
21
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